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POETRY, TERRORISM, AND THE 
UNCANNY: “TIMOTHY MCVEIGH’S 
‘INVICTUS’”
David McCooey
Timothy McVeigh—the Oklahoma City Bomber—was executed by le-
thal injection at the Federal Correctional Complex at Terre Haute in In-
diana on June 11, 2001. He made no verbal statement to those who had 
gathered to witness his execution.1 He did, however, offer the following 
handwritten document as his “Final Written Statement” (figure 1):2
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According to the New York Times, this document was “distributed [to the 
media] by officials at the federal prison in Terre Haute.”3
McVeigh had been found guilty of bombing (with the aid of two co-
conspirators) the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City 
on 19 April (Patriot’s Day) 1995. It was an act that killed 168 people, in-
cluding nineteen children, fifteen of whom were in the America’s Kids 
Day Care Center housed within the Murrah Building. It was the deadliest 
act of terrorism within the United States prior to 9/11. After his convic-
tion, McVeigh argued that his attack was a justifiable response to the US 
government, citing deadly sieges caused by federal agents at Waco, Texas, 
in 1993, and Ruby Ridge, Idaho, in 1992. McVeigh was tried in a federal 
court for the murder of eight federal officers and subsequently became 
the first convicted criminal to be executed by the US federal government 
since 1963.
I do not wish to discuss here McVeigh’s possible motives. Nor do I wish 
to discuss the trial, save for one moment in the proceedings. Rather, I wish 
to attend to McVeigh’s “Final Written Statement,” a document that at-
tracts little more than a quizzical mention in most accounts of McVeigh’s 
crime and punishment. At first glance, the text is outwardly simple. The 
main text, with its lineation and use of end rhyme, is clearly a poem. The 
document’s peritexts—to use Gérard Genette’s term for those paratextual 
communicative elements at the threshold of a text—are notably spare, 
failing to tell us two important things about the text: the title and the 
author of the poem. The poem is “Invictus,” Latin for “unconquerable,” 
and it was written by W. E. Henley in 1875 in response to the amputation 
of his leg due to the bone tuberculosis he suffered throughout his life. 
The poem is described by The Oxford Companion to English Literature as 
a “defiant and stoic” work.4 Despite its low status in elite literary culture, 
it continues to be cited as an inspirational work for readers, ranging from 
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown5—which one commentator saw as 
“equivalent to choosing ‘My Way’ as a Desert Island Disc”6—to an anony-
mous reader of O: The Oprah Magazine.7
McVeigh’s decision to present a culturally ambiguous poem as his, or 
the metonym for his, “final statement” makes this document an excep-
tionally difficult one to gloss. What would it mean to read this poem as 
“Timothy McVeigh’s ‘Invictus’”? To what extent is this work a literary 
act? To what extent is it even a poem? How do we reconcile this act of 
quotation with other acts of literary appropriation? “Timothy McVeigh’s 
‘Invictus’” is, I would argue, a limit case for our understanding of po-
etry, quotation, and the relationship between literary and nonliterary 
discourses.
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In this essay, I will consider how McVeigh’s enigmatic act of appropri-
ation produces a poetry of the uncanny whereby seemingly stable catego-
ries such as poet and terrorist are shown to be disquietingly porous. I will 
also consider how “Timothy McVeigh’s ‘Invictus’” demonstrates the vola-
tility of some basic concerns of contemporary literary theory, especially 
with regard to quotation, obscurity, and poetic address. Lastly, I wish to 
consider how “Timothy McVeigh’s ‘Invictus’” illustrates the unpredict-
able ways that a supposedly marginal cultural practice—poetry—can act 
in times of crisis.
* * *
The elision of the poem’s title for the document’s title is an important fea-
ture of the writing and dissemination of McVeigh’s “Final Written State-
ment.” The omission of the word “Invictus” may have been a mistake on 
McVeigh’s behalf. (It seems unlikely that McVeigh was aware that the 
title “Invictus” appeared only when the poem was anthologized in Ar-
thur Quiller-Couch’s The Oxford Book of English Verse [1900]. Previously 
the poem, which was dedicated in memoriam to R. T. Hamilton Bruce, 
was the untitled fourth part of a sequence entitled “Echoes.”) Whatever 
the case, the inclusion of the words “Final Written Statement of Timothy 
McVeigh” certainly was not accidental. The adjectives make clear that 
this is not just any statement by Timothy McVeigh, and as such they call 
attention to their author’s implicit understanding of the importance that 
such a statement will hold for the public. As Marita Sturken makes clear 
in Tourists of History: Memory, Kitsch, and Consumerism from Oklahoma 
City to Ground Zero (2007), McVeigh had considerable access to the media 
in the last years of his life, especially just prior to his execution, and his 
ability to “get his voice into the media . . . was understood by the fami-
lies and survivors of the Oklahoma City bombing to be an explicit and 
direct infliction of pain upon them.”8 As Sturken also points out, “At the 
same time, many of those in Oklahoma City fed the media frenzy by de-
manding over and over again in public statements that he apologize for 
his actions, so that they too appeared to be invested in his every word.”9 
McVeigh’s final statement, then, was not an act devoid of a context or 
lacking in moment.
As such, McVeigh’s simultaneous (verbal) silence and (written) quo-
tation of a nineteenth-century poem may seem curiously anticlimactic. 
Both acts, however, can be seen to contain considerable, if paradoxical, 
energy. McVeigh’s verbal silence was clearly not only a strategic refusal 
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to offer the apology desired by some, but a refusal to offer anything ver-
bally during the spectacle of his execution. His quotation of “Invictus” is 
also self-evidently a refusal to offer an apology. Indeed, given the senti-
ment of the poem, it is an act, simultaneously blatant and symbolic, of 
self-aggrandizement. Unlike his verbal silence, however, the reason that 
McVeigh’s last written statement took the form it did is not immediately 
clear. By choosing the indirect symbolic language of poetry (made doubly 
indirect via quotation), McVeigh is strategically enigmatic, offering a last 
statement that can resonate long after the moment of his execution.
The potential for such resonance can be judged in part by the singu-
lar nature of McVeigh’s “Final Written Statement.” In Robert K. Elder’s 
grim collection of final statements (both written and verbal) by condemned 
American criminals, Last Words of the Executed (2010), which includes 
McVeigh’s, there is no comparable statement. According to Elder, the 
collection’s historical organization, moving from hanging to lethal injec-
tion, represents a “cultural shift” in terms of “last words” as a kind of 
generic performance: “As execution moved from a very open spectacle 
with public square hangings to a very intimate event behind prison walls, 
last words became less formal and more plainspoken.”10 McVeigh, both in 
being verbally silent and in textually quoting a nineteenth-century poem 
(which is formal in both tone and structure), was operating in stark con-
trast to this shift. As such, McVeigh appears to be using the conventional 
performance of “last words” to highlight not only the significance of his 
execution but also its singularity.
Despite Studs Terkel describing, in his foreword to Last Words of the 
Executed, the prisoners’ statements as a kind of poetry (“the actual poetry 
in the speech of people at the most traumatic moment of their lives”11), 
generally little is conventionally “poetic” in the last statements of con-
victed criminals in the contemporary period. The following two examples 
are representative of this lack of lyricism: “I deserve this. Tell everyone I 
said goodbye”; and “Goodbye to my family; I love all of you, I’m sorry 
for the victim’s family. I wish I could make it up to them. I want those 
out there to keep fighting the death penalty.”12 The first statement was by 
Charles William Bass, the second by Randy Woolls, both of whom were 
convicted of murder in Texas and executed in 1986. The other contem-
porary statements collected in Last Words of the Executed range broadly 
in tone from humble to aggressive or flippant, but only one can be lik-
ened to McVeigh’s quotation. Michael L. McBride, in a written statement, 
quoted parts of the Bible, and “Do Not Stand at My Grave and Weep,” a 
poem attributed to Mary Elizabeth Frye (1905–2004).13 But this choice of 
poem makes the statement more in line with the conventional religious or 
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repentant statements common to many other prisoners. It has little of the 
self-mythology of McVeigh’s quotation of “Invictus.” (McBride also did 
not maintain the verbal silence that McVeigh managed.) McBride’s state-
ment lacks paratextual features, such as the peritext of a title, suggesting 
that McBride was disinclined to present his text as having public signifi-
cance (beyond that which applies to the execution of anyone).
As a peritext, then, “Final Written Statement of Timothy McVeigh” is 
one of considerable note. Whereas Genette in Paratexts: Thresholds of In-
terpretation (1997) is concerned with literary texts (or perhaps I should say 
literary acts), his distinction between the addressees of a title and the ad-
dressees of a text remains pertinent with regard to McVeigh’s statement: 
“[I]f the text is an object to be read, the title (like, moreover, the name 
of the author) is an object to be circulated—or, if you prefer, a subject of 
conversation.”14 In this case, too, for those readers who recognize a dis-
junction between title (“Final Written Statement of Timothy McVeigh”) 
and text (W. E. Henley’s “Invictus”), the title becomes more than an object 
of conversation (which it is): it becomes a provocation, for how could it 
not be provocative for a convicted murderer (a terrorist) to cite a canonical 
poem about stoicism and suffering by a poet conventionally respected for 
his bravery.
Not surprisingly, a number of commentators were provoked. Some 
saw McVeigh’s act of literary appropriation as an act of cultural vandal-
ism and a statement of bad faith. For instance, J.C., the author of an “NB” 
column in the Times Literary Supplement, saw the poem as “hopelessly 
inappropriate,” since Henley, unlike McVeigh, was “up against” fate, not 
the state. J.C. adds that the poem
might have been more suitably mumbled by the maimed 
survivors of the bomb, rather than the bomber. The famous 
line, “My head is bloody, but unbowed”, evoking courage 
in the face of dreadful disablement, can scarcely be said to 
apply to the mass murderer McVeigh, who is anyway not 
“unbowed” but dead. Even the “unconquerable soul” part 
does not fit McVeigh, a self-proclaimed agnostic.15
While more muted, A. N. Wilson, writing in the Telegraph, also found 
McVeigh’s choice “curiously unsuitable for the occasion.”16
In 2005, Catherine Robson, also writing in the Times Literary Sup-
plement, revisited McVeigh’s final statement, drawing attention to the 
competing uses of the poem, from its continued place (post-McVeigh) 
in at least one American high school as an inspirational poem worthy 
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of memorization (possibly how McVeigh knew the poem) to its use in 
an advertisement for a gun-mounted flashlight. She also refers to Oscar 
Wilde’s allusion to the poem in his prose apologia De Profundis (1905). 
Robson fails to mention the importance of the poem to Nelson Mandela, 
who was, of course, defined as a terrorist by the apartheid-era South Af-
rican government. Mandela’s use of the poem as an inspiration while in 
prison is alluded to in the biographical sports drama Invictus (dir. Clint 
Eastwood, 2009), an account of the 1995 Rugby World Cup, held during 
Mandela’s tenure as president in postapartheid South Africa. Robson does 
note, however, the use of “Invictus” by the Atlantic Olympics bomber, 
Eric Rudolph, who killed two people and injured 111 others at the 1996 
Olympic Games, and who referred to himself in a seven-page manifesto 
as “a little bloodied, but emphatically unbowed.” Regarding the use of 
the poem by terrorists, Robson asks, “How can you state that your own 
head is ‘bloody, but unbowed’ after you have caused the brutal deaths and 
woundings of others?”17
But moving beyond issues of aptness, we see how McVeigh’s quota-
tion, or appropriation, is marked by the paradox of enigma (which Aris-
totle defined in his Poetics as the “putting together of impossible things” 
[58a]). It offers a strange mix of clarity and ambiguity, articulating a clear 
statement of self-mythology, on the one hand, while, on the other, articu-
lating nothing but an obscurely literary act of unknown status. In quoting 
another—in refusing to speak with his “own voice”—McVeigh is para-
doxically both silent and not silent, both offering an account of himself 
while withholding such an account.
Such a strategy is consistent with McVeigh’s one verbal statement—
also a quotation—at his trial. Just before he was sentenced, McVeigh made 
his only statement in court: “I wish to use the words of Justice Brandeis 
dissenting in Olmstead to speak for me. He wrote, ‘Our government is 
the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole 
people by its example.’”18 After making this statement, McVeigh was sen-
tenced to death by the state.
Olmstead vs the United States (1928) was a case about privacy, testing 
whether wiretapped private phone conversations, obtained by federal 
agents without judicial approval and used as evidence, broached the de-
fendants’ Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. (The Fourth Amend-
ment guards against unreasonable searches and seizures, whereas the 
Fifth Amendment protects against government abuse of process in a 
legal procedure.) While the issue of privacy may seem a long way from 
McVeigh’s trial, the issue of government power is at the center of it, at 
least according to McVeigh’s script. As a profoundly ironic counterpoint 
 POETRY, TERRORISM, AND THE UNCANNY 491
to his sentencing, using the language of the court at the very moment a 
court brings its most severe sentence against him, McVeigh’s citation of 
Justice Brandeis is also consistent with his putative justification for vio-
lence. His violent act, McVeigh implies, is bookended by the violent acts 
sanctioned by the government: the attacks at Waco and Ruby Ridge,19 and 
McVeigh’s impending execution.
McVeigh’s attraction to strategic quotation can also be seen in that 
when, after the bombing, McVeigh was pulled over by an Oklahoma 
state trooper for driving without a license plate, he was wearing a T-shirt 
adorned with a quote from Thomas Jefferson that is allegedly favored by 
militias: “The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with 
the blood of patriots and tyrants.”20 Taken from a letter by Jefferson, who 
was serving as ambassador to France at the time, to William Smith (a 
politician and son-in-law of John Adams) in 1787, the comment refers 
to Shays’s Rebellion in Massachusetts (1786–87). No doubt, McVeigh, 
like the militias that favor this quote, was attracted to the authority of a 
founding father, and the principal author of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, apparently giving license to political violence.
Initially, however, McVeigh’s citational practices were largely ignored. 
For most observers at the time, the significance of McVeigh’s quotation 
of “Invictus” as a final statement was overshadowed by McVeigh’s refusal 
to make a verbal statement immediately prior to his execution. As Stur-
ken writes in Tourists of History, “[S]o much emphasis had been placed 
on speculation about his last words that his decision not to speak car-
ried tremendous weight.”21 This observation is supported by Jody Lynee 
Ma deira’s study on the effects that McVeigh’s verbal silence had on the 
relatives of those killed in the Oklahoma City bombing, “Blood relations: 
Collective Memory, Cultural Trauma, and the Prosecution and Execution 
of Timothy McVeigh” (2008). Madeira reports that most participants of her 
study express either anger or relief at McVeigh’s silence.22 The effect that 
McVeigh’s quotation of “Invictus” had on her subjects is not considered.
Sturken, however, argues that McVeigh’s verbal silence and textual 
citation are actually related effects, both having to do with the issue of 
“agency”: “McVeigh’s final refusal to speak was his last tactical move to 
give the impression that he was in control of his own death. He also at-
tempted to establish his own agency in the final statement that he released 
to the press through prison officials.”23 Such agency is clearly related to 
McVeigh’s self-presentation of himself as heroically facing down the vio-
lent state, as seen in his earlier in-court citation of Justice Brandeis. (It is 
also consistent with McVeigh’s refusal to put off the date of his execution 
by undertaking any further legal appeals.24) According to Gore Vidal, 
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who corresponded with McVeigh and who, according to Sturken, rep-
resents the “oddest allegiance” that McVeigh created with the press, the 
quotation of Henley’s poem can indeed be read in terms of agency, albeit 
as a form of self-heroizing: “The stoic serenity of McVeigh’s last days cer-
tainly qualified him as a Henley-style hero.”25 It would be true to say that 
this is a minority position among mainstream commentators.
McVeigh’s quotation of Henley is perhaps at its most provocative when 
it is seen as demonstrating the scandalous fact that the world, even the 
world of terrorists, can have purchase on the world of art. (Similarly, his 
quotation of Judge Brandeis is a scandalous demonstration of the crimi-
nal’s access to the language of the law.) That McVeigh’s final statement 
was recognizably of the culture that he had attacked underscored the pro-
foundly difficult fact that an American was responsible for such an act 
of terrorism. McVeigh’s quotation of Henley is scandalous, then, not just 
because it “stole” the words of a worthy poet or because of its inappropri-
ateness, but also because it shows the terrorist as “one of us,” as culturally 
literate, and as having access to sophisticated forms of articulacy: quo-
tation, irony, symbolism, and poetic speech. That all of these forms are 
underscored by ambiguity only adds to their scandalous sophistication.
This unsettling effect of showing the terrorist as “one of us” relates 
to McVeigh’s place in American culture more generally. One of the fea-
tures of McVeigh that was most problematic, and perhaps fascinating, 
for the American media was his Americanness, especially given that in the 
immediate aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing it was generally 
assumed that an American could not have been responsible for such an 
act. As Edward T. Linenthal points out in Unfinished Bombing: Oklahoma 
City in American Memory (2003), after the bombing “[t]here was an im-
mediate and widespread call to arms against Muslim terrorists. Editorials 
called for a military response, perhaps even against foreign governments 
that sponsored this act of terrorism.”26 As Linenthal relates, the ensuing 
response to McVeigh as both the alleged and convicted terrorist ranged 
widely in terms of how McVeigh was characterized (with the media being 
far less interested in his coconspirators), but a major strand of that re-
sponse was to insist on McVeigh’s Americanness. This element was one 
that McVeigh himself clearly picked up on (as, of course, someone who 
styled himself as an American patriot would). A notable example of such 
self-styling is McVeigh’s response to a question from Fox News about 
him describing his juvenile victims as “collateral damage”: “Collateral 
damage? As an American news junkie, a military man, and a Gulf War 
veteran, where do you think I learned that?”27 Such a moment shows that 
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what is meant by American is already haunted, in an uncanny fashion, by 
what might seem most un-American.
As this example suggests (like the quotations of “Invictus,” Judge 
Brandeis, and Thomas Jefferson), one of the unsettling features of McVeigh’s 
crime and punishment was the way in which discourse was repeatedly 
shown to be a volatile force. Language used in one context could be strate-
gically employed against its user in another context. McVeigh’s quotation of 
Henley illustrates such discursive volatility with particular reference to the 
supposedly marginal discourse of poetry. In this violent point of intersection 
between the discourses of terrorism and poetry—at the very moment of 
McVeigh’s public execution—McVeigh’s quotation produces, or unveils, a 
radically uncanny model of poetry, one that undermines conventional ideas 
about what is considered proper to poetry. It does this by showing that the 
discourse of poetry is one already haunted by the putatively antipoetic (just 
like the discourse of “Americanness” is haunted by the “un-American”), of 
which terrorism is a paradigmatic example.
In Sigmund Freud’s foundational essay on the uncanny (the Eng-
lish translation for unheimlich, or “unhomely”), he goes to considerable 
lengths to show how the terms unheimlich and heimlich (or “homely”) are 
radically unstable, the one inhabiting the other. Considering the seman-
tics of the two terms, he concludes that “what is called heimlich becomes 
unheimlich.”28 Taking his cue from Freud, Nicholas Royle in his epony-
mous book on the uncanny writes that the uncanny “can consist in a sense 
of homeliness uprooted, the revelation of something unhomely at the 
heart of hearth and home.”29 McVeigh’s final statement, with its scandal-
ous sophistication, clearly shows up something “unhomely at the heart of 
hearth and home,” profoundly akin to his status as an “American terror-
ist” (to cite the title of one of the more controversial books on McVeigh).
Two main features of the uncanny relate to “Timothy McVeigh’s 
‘Invictus.’” According to Royle, the uncanny is “a crisis of the proper” 
(disturbing notions of ownership and proper names) and “a crisis of the 
natural” (disturbing understandings of self, human nature, and the na-
ture of the world).30 Firstly, “Timothy McVeigh’s ‘Invictus’” is a crisis 
of the proper because it disturbs notions of ownership by radically un-
settling the poem’s provenance. Where does the poem begin? With the 
author’s intentions or the intentions of the person quoting it? Who can 
properly speak of the poem as being theirs? The author or its user? The 
poem seems now to (improperly) have two names associated with it (Hen-
ley’s and McVeigh’s), and its recontextualization unsettles typical notions 
about what uses poetry could properly be put to. McVeigh’s citation of 
the poem also instigates a crisis of the natural, since in its illustration of a 
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terrorist as articulate and cultured it shows human nature and the nature 
of the world to be suddenly unfamiliar and uncertain.
The uncanny effects that McVeigh’s quotation produces also bleed 
into discourses about poetry, most obviously literary theory, illustrating 
the truly volatile nature of modern literary theory’s interest in citation, 
repetition, and parody. In demonstrating language’s infinite potential for 
recontextualization, “Timothy McVeigh’s ‘Invictus’” is a discomforting 
example of the Derridean concept of dissemination, in which uncontrol-
lable meaning is endlessly dispersed.
McVeigh, then, can insert himself into literary-theoretical discourse in 
a way that makes such discourse disconcertingly unfamiliar (or illustrates 
the implications it is disinclined to follow up). James Longenbach, for 
instance, presumably did not have McVeigh’s poetic act in mind in The 
Resistance to Poetry (2004), his work on poetry’s self-resisting language, 
but as the following passage shows, it can be read as uncannily apposite:
But poems do not necessarily ask to be trusted. Their lan-
guage revels in duplicity and disjunction, making it diffi-
cult for us to assume that any particular poetic gesture is 
inevitably responsible or irresponsible to the culture that 
gives the language meaning: a poem’s obfuscation of the es-
tablished terms of accountability might be the poem’s most 
accountable act—or it might not. Distrust of poetry (its po-
tential for inconsequence, its pretensions to consequence) is 
the stuff of poetry.31
If Longenbach is correct, then McVeigh’s most uncanny, and scandalous, 
move was to engage in a terroristic practice that was also ironically proper 
to the discourse of poetry and, by implication, literature more generally.
McVeigh’s act also illustrates the unconscious utopianism of much 
lite rary theory, as the previous reference to Derrida may have suggested. 
Such utopianism stems from the inherent abstraction of literary theory. 
The free play of meaning is usually considered as a form of hermeneutic 
energy that is unambiguously positive. For instance, and to choose an ex-
ample almost at random, from the vast body of secondary literature that 
disseminates literary-theoretical ideas, in his primer on the work of Paul 
Ricoeur (a theorist interested in the intersubjective dynamics of texts), 
Karl Simms summarizes Ricoeur’s theory of hermeneutics:
Interpreting texts—doing hermeneutics—is the route 
to self-understanding as a human being, because being 
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historical—having historicity—is a specifically human 
trait. Texts propose a world which readers appropriate to 
under stand their own world, and consequently to under-
stand themselves. Texts are the medium through which 
readers arrive at self-understanding; they are the bridge 
between the subjectivity of the self and the objectivity of 
the world.32
This, of course, is true enough, but it does not seem to consider the pos-
sibility that subjects such as McVeigh might “do hermeneutics” in ways 
that show little self-understanding or acknowledgment of the world’s ob-
jectivity. No doubt it could be argued that McVeigh misreads his text, 
but as Harold Bloom’s The Anxiety of Influence (1973) argues, misprision, 
or misreading, is also the hallmark of the strong poet.33 In other words, 
McVeigh is everywhere anticipated by literary theory, and nowhere ac-
counted for by it.
A more detailed reading of the link between McVeigh’s act and the 
importance of quotation in literary-theoretical discourse will help estab-
lish this further. In Mary Orr’s long discussion of quotation in Intertextu-
ality: Debates and Contexts (2003), she writes, “Quotation is . . . the most 
condensed form of paradigm shift, transmuting the context, form and 
meaning of the items both inside and outside the quotation marks. It is 
always enrichment by inclusion, integration and proclamation of other-
ness, a dialogue not a monologue.”34 McVeigh’s quotation certainly fulfills 
the terms of the first sentence. But few would argue that his use of “Invic-
tus” amounts to “enrichment by inclusion, integration and proclamation 
of otherness.” Orr would no doubt argue that this is because McVeigh’s 
quotation does not fulfill one of the basic criteria of quotation: aptness.35 
As demonstrated, a common response to McVeigh’s use of “Invictus” is 
to comment on its singular (criminal?) inappropriateness. In McVeigh’s 
mind, of course, the poem was presumably appropriate, but then so (ap-
parently) was his bombing of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City. 
The notion of aptness, as Orr makes clear, is central to the practice of quo-
tation, but this too is associated (less obviously) with a utopian sense of 
possibility:
Quotation also re-energizes and effects [sic] what borders 
on the marked segment (in literal or metaphorical speech 
marks) in both quoted and quoting contexts. It is in the 
latter especially that the negotiation process that consti-
tutes aptness is worked out. Quotation therefore names an 
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aptitude in selecting and rejecting sites and configurations 
to make the old and new fit together. As dynamic strategy 
to harmonize affinity and repulsion, provocation and revo-
calization in both host frames, quotation is the locus of a si-
multaneously magnetic (centripetal) and counter-magnetic 
(centrifugal) force.36
The force of McVeigh’s quoting practice would seem to be less about 
harmonizing competing forces than violently rejecting an order that the 
state, or society, would try to impose upon him.
Aptness, then, is clearly not merely a literary matter, or one of “taste.” 
Rather, what makes for an “apt” quotation is something that is open to 
considerable dispute. The realm of “the literary,” then, is not the utopian 
space that literary theory would often have it be. It is, like any social space, 
a space open to violence, abuse, and conflict. Orr seems to recognize this 
possibility in her description of allusion (a muted form of quotation), 
which she likens to an echo: “Like an echo, it depends on the noise that 
makes it, but is no less a presence that resounds, reverberates, distorts, 
mocks or amplifies.”37 Distortion, mockery, and amplification are cer-
tainly elements of McVeigh’s quotation of “Invictus.” And as Orr notes, 
“[T]he Devil is also a quoter but not a giver of Scripture. Therefore, it is 
not what is repeated, or indeed who repeats, that is intrinsic to quotation, 
but the how and why of its repetition.”38 In this case, the how and why 
of the repetition produce an uncanny echo (of a poem that originally ap-
peared in a sequence called “Echoes”) that distorts, mocks, and amplifies 
both the original text and its immediate cultural context. But generally 
speaking, Orr is uninterested in the how and why of the Devil’s quoting 
practices.
While a lack of interest in such matters may be common in literary 
theory, it is not universal. Daniel Tiffany’s Infidel Poetics: Riddles, Night-
life, Substance (2009), for instance, sees a link between criminal and poetic 
discourses. Tiffany takes as his starting point the problem of lyric obscu-
rity, that seductive poetic obscurity that commonly employs various lin-
guistic items, such as slang, foreign to its readers. Such works range from 
sixteenth-century canting songs (verse written in the jargon of the criminal 
underworld) to contemporary rap lyrics. Readers of such obscure poetry 
are willing to “pay for the pleasure of cruising the unknown in a text, 
to sample the tongue of the cultural ‘infidel,’ ” where infidel refers to a 
persona shaped by the criminal underworld and political radicalism.39 Tif-
fany’s project is to see beyond conventional literary theoretical responses to 
obscurity—hermeneutic or cryptographic forms of interpretation seeking a 
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meaning that is considered to be “strategically or incidentally impaired”—
to a recognition of the “spectacle” of obscurity’s “pragmatic, aesthetic, and 
social effects.”40
This reference to lyric obscurity unleashing a spectacle of social ef-
fects is clearly suggestive with regard to “Timothy McVeigh’s ‘Invictus.’” 
“Invictus,” however, does not on the face of it appear to be particularly 
obscure (even if it does mobilize tropes of obscurity in its first and third 
stanzas). However, as Tiffany points out, poetry persists generally in a 
state of cultural obscurity, and, more importantly, obscurity is “disclosed 
upon reception . . . not something intrinsic to particular properties of the 
verbal artefact.”41 For Tiffany, “the problematic of lyric obscurity” re-
quires us to isolate not a poem’s moment of composition or construction, 
but “its reception by the reader, on poetic readership, and on the social 
configuration of poetry.”42 In the sense of reception, “Timothy McVeigh’s 
‘Invictus’” is—as this essay has been demonstrating—a notable example 
of lyrical obscurity.
Relevant to our understanding, too, of “Timothy McVeigh’s ‘Invictus’” 
is Tiffany’s argument that an understanding of lyric obscurity requires an 
uncovering of the links between obscurity and the aesthetic experience of 
the sublime (an experience conventionally associated with catastrophe). 
Tiffany approaches the problem of the sublime as a feature of obscurity 
by suspending hermeneutical and cryptographic approaches to lyric ob-
scurity and “pursuing a critique of obscurity rooted in concepts of action, 
expression, and aesthetic captivation”43 or, in other words, an understand-
ing of obscurity as a social act.
More problematic for our purposes is not the relative lack of obscurity 
with regard to “Invictus” (as a text), but Tiffany’s rejection of the common 
assumption that obscurity originates in the arcane, experimental, and vir-
tuosic works of elite culture (which is more or less the provenance of “In-
victus,” despite its current relatively low standing in elite literary culture). 
Rather, Tiffany looks to the origins of obscurity in the misunderstanding 
of demotic speech as seen in the lyric vernacular of poems composed in 
“slang, jargon, or dialect,” such as nursery rhymes, riddles, canting songs, 
and other submerged genres. Lyric obscurity becomes instead associated 
with “the dangerous speech of various social underworlds,” reversing the 
conventional association with the sublime and loftiness to produce a “so-
ciological” sublime associated with various social underworlds.44
One of the notable features of McVeigh’s use of “Invictus” is the way in 
which it complicates Tiffany’s model of lyric obscurity, since it shows how 
the movement between “vernacular” and “elite” cultures is not necessar-
ily one way. Rather than offering an example of elite culture using the 
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language of the criminal for the pleasure of “cruising the unknown text” 
by sampling the “tongue of the cultural ‘infidel,’ ” “Timothy McVeigh’s 
‘Invictus’” reverses this structure. McVeigh mobilizes the language of 
elite culture (albeit a past elite culture) to engage in a socially obscure act 
that seeks to captivate its audience through the catastrophic language of 
the sublime. Such catastrophic imagery can only, of course, call to mind 
the material catastrophe that McVeigh caused. A detailed discussion of 
Tiffany’s study of the link between lyric obscurity and Leibniz’s theory 
of monads (self-sufficient mental entities), as a way of locating the ma-
terial or “substance” of obscurity, is beyond the scope of this essay, but 
Tiffany’s characterization of lyric obscurity as the ground of a negative 
sociability—“a splintering of mass experience into ‘sleeper cells’”45—is 
again surprisingly suggestive.
Also suggestive is the more profound link that Tiffany makes between 
poetic expression and catastrophe by attending, as others have done be-
fore him, to the apparent historical link between riddle (or enigma) and 
the lyric obscurity of modernist poetry (and artistic expression generally). 
Tiffany sees the source of this link as an ancient one, arguing that “[a]ny 
serious consideration of the riddle as an enduring but occluded source 
of poetry must begin with the mythical figure of the Sphinx” (a figure 
that has concerned thinkers from Hegel to Maurice Blanchot and Giorgio 
Agamben).46 The Sphinx was identified in antiquity as a poet, and her 
riddle was identified as a type of poetry. Sophocles, however, identifies 
the Sphinx as a rhapsode (that is, a Homeric singer or epic poet), which 
is eccentric to say the least, given that her “work” (one riddle) is clearly 
a departure from the epic tradition. As Tiffany suggests, this raises the 
troubling and subversive suggestion that the riddle was an instrument 
of “public, even civic, discourse.”47 There are, of course, divergences be-
tween the riddling Sphinx and Timothy McVeigh (the Sphinx, like the 
Sirens and the Harpies, illustrates an ancient misogynistic association be-
tween dread and female voices); nevertheless, the riddling Sphinx does 
offer a way of understanding McVeigh’s “literary” act. For instance, as 
Tiffany writes,
The riddle of the Sphinx is not merely apotropaic [a pro-
tective power warding off evil] in its terrifying effects but 
apocalyptic, as it combines the promise of revelation and 
the threat of annihilation. In this respect, the operation 
of the riddle of the Sphinx captures a moment of public 
discourse when a certain kind of terror must be counted 
among the effects of poetry.48
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The link between terrorism and poetry is, indeed, one that Tiffany explic-
itly, if briefly, makes himself:
As a poet, the ancient Sphinx may thus be compared to the 
riddling serial killers and cryptographers of modernity (the 
Zodiac Killer or the Unabomber), each producing a ver-
nacular train of “poetry” (in their cryptic letters to the pub-
lic) recalling the apotropaic allure of the Sphinx and her 
single, compulsively reiterated poem.49
Tiffany argues that such “allure” is related to a confusion of logic and lyri-
cism, a confusion of course that McVeigh himself mobilizes. The rhap-
sodic poem
takes possession of public space as a materialization of re-
flection, acting as an instrument of poetic or philosophical 
terror—a terror that is “honey-sweet.” . . . Suspended be-
tween jinx and logic, rhapsodic poetry survives historically 
either by rarefaction—diagramming an “icy tremor of ab-
straction”—or by disappearing into the vernacular, that 
is, into the vernacular conjugation of song, reflection, and 
agitation.50
While McVeigh does not unambiguously belong to this tradition (he was 
not, for one thing, itinerant), the perceptible link in “Timothy McVeigh’s 
‘Invictus’” between obscurity, terror, public discourse, abstraction, and 
agitation illustrates that McVeigh’s enigmatic literary act can be under-
stood, to some extent, through a literary-theoretical discourse that is not 
simply, and unconsciously, utopian in expression.
Literary theory, whatever its attitude, forces us to consider how 
McVeigh’s appropriation of a poem relates to other acts of poetic appropria-
tion (or dissemination). McVeigh’s appropriation draws attention to those 
appropriations that occur daily in encounters between lovers, in wedding 
ceremonies, in readings at funerals, and in the ordinary act of solitary read-
ing. While quotidian in nature, such usages are deeply associated with emo-
tional intensity and, often enough, ordinary contact with extreme events 
associated with the sublime, death, and catastrophe. As already suggested, 
McVeigh’s appropriation causes disquiet partly because he shows the radi-
cally unstable nature of texts, and, indeed, the possibility that a text may re-
ally be said to exist only in its momentary and various uses. Some texts are so 
repeatedly appropriated and in such clearly routinized ways (Shakespeare 
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in classrooms and the Bible in churches being two instances) that we even 
cease to see that they have been appropriated, and (by association) we cease 
to see how such cultural activities are associated with responding to sublime 
and catastrophic events. Presumably this routinization of cultural appropri-
ation was the reason for McVeigh’s quotation of Henley’s poem—a poem 
long associated with educational institutions and memorization—without 
quotation marks or attribution.
In appropriating “Invictus” for his final statement, McVeigh was act-
ing as the speaker at his own death (ironically so, in the light of his verbal 
silence prior to his execution), a moment otherwise marked by silence 
or the officialese of the state (another form of obscurity) and the noise of 
the press. Given that the reading of poetry—which we can designate a 
discourse of extremity—is especially common at funerals and memorial-
ization ceremonies, the quotation of poetry for McVeigh’s “Final Written 
Statement” has, as ever, an uncannily double element to it. McVeigh’s act 
of using a poem as a final statement is both utterly singular and com-
pletely generic, grossly inappropriate and deeply conventional. Either 
way—singular or generic—his appropriation, as I have been demonstrat-
ing, radically unsettles our usual notions of “poetry” and “terrorist.”
McVeigh’s turn to poetry was prefigured by ordinary citizens respond-
ing to McVeigh’s and his coconspirators’ crime. As Linenthal relates in 
Unfinished Bombing, directly after the Oklahoma City bombing, people 
not only sent poems to the Oklahoma City Council, but even called to 
read them over the phone to council staff. Linenthal writes that
judging from the massive collection in the [Oklahoma City 
National] Memorial Foundation’s archives, poems were 
one of the most popular forms of memorial expression: 
“The Day Oklahoma Cried,” “Why?” “We Will Always 
Remember,” “I’m in Heaven,” “And the Angels Came,” 
“God’s Day Care,” “Loss of the Innocents,” “A Rescuer’s 
Lament,” “Rise Up, Gallant Heartland,” “A Time to Heal,” 
“Heartache in the Heartland,” “Let the Angels Close Their 
Eyes,” “Tim’s Dance with the Devil,” “The Day the Build-
ing Came Down.”51
As this suggests, poetry, despite its apparent cultural marginality, has a 
curiously powerful position in vernacular culture when it comes to mo-
ments of crisis. A similar observation was made about the importance 
of poetry after 9/11.52 However much we may wish to separate their in-
tentions, presumably what both McVeigh and the citizens who wrote 
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these poems held by the Oklahoma City National Memorial Foundation 
sought was a language that was of enough import to contain a particular, 
traumatic moment. They sought a language that was both public and a 
“discourse of extremity.” “Timothy McVeigh’s ‘Invictus’” is disquieting 
partly because it seems to link symbolically and improperly—through a 
common cultural technology and language known as poetry—the vic-
tims, onlookers, and perpetrator of a terrible crime.
The commonality of this technology is not coincidental, as a brief con-
sideration of lyric address might show. In William Waters’s study of lyric 
address, Poetry’s Touch (2003), he focuses on second-person poems (that 
is, lyric poetry that addresses a you) to show that lyric poetry, contrary to 
traditional ways of thinking, is a mode profoundly concerned with inter-
subjective contact rather than the presentation of a singular, self-absorbed 
lyric-I. Although “Timothy McVeigh’s ‘Invictus’” does not employ the 
 second-person pronoun, the nature of its “composition,” dissemination, 
and reception makes it impossible not to see it as a poem addressing a large, 
public audience, in contrast to most lyric poems that exist without such a 
“disambiguating context,” to use Waters’s term.53 Approaching “Timothy 
McVeigh’s ‘Invictus’” in terms of intersubjective contact may seem at odds 
with my earlier discussion of it in terms of Tiffany’s study of lyric obscurity. 
Granted, Tiffany is concerned with lyric obscurity as a social act, but his 
attention to the negative sociability of the monad (which expresses but does 
not communicate) suggests that we are tracing another paradoxical feature 
of “Timothy McVeigh’s ‘Invictus,’” since it is a work that both connects and 
disconnects, communicates deeply while merely expressing.
The relevant elements of Waters’s study for our purposes are his concern 
with the poem as spell and the poem as monument or epitaph. The poem as 
spell is one that, like the Sphinx’s riddle discussed earlier, “pursues, pins, or 
holds in deadly fascination the one spoken to,” which is often the reader.54 
As Waters notes in his reading of a poem by the nineteenth- century Ger-
man poet Eduard Mörike, such poems work the memento mori tradition 
into a portent of “something bearing down upon a you. In this case the ap-
proaching figure is the grave itself.”55 The text of “Invictus” engages not 
only the language of mortality (the black night, the “menace of the years”), 
but also the figure of mortality as something “bearing down” upon the 
speaker: “Beyond this place of wrath and tears / Looms but the Horror of 
the Shade.” One might argue that this has little to do with a you, since the 
perspective of the poem is unambiguously first-person.
But read as “Timothy McVeigh’s ‘Invictus,’” one can’t help but see the 
poem as one that (silently) addresses a you, drawing that audience into a 
consideration of mortality by dint of both the poem’s text and its context, 
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especially when conceived in terms of social effects. Inasmuch as an individ-
ual physical text generally has one reader, the poem becomes one especially 
concerning an individual reader’s own mortality. Read in this way, “Invic-
tus” (which is to say “Timothy McVeigh’s ‘Invictus’”) becomes, especially in 
its concluding two lines, a kind of dare to the reader, reading a poem by a 
recently executed man. This dare could be phrased as something like “how 
do you view your soul?” or, more tellingly, “how would you view your soul 
just before your appointed death?” Such daring could, in part, be the source 
of the discomforting intimacy of McVeigh’s last statement, since death—
that most improper of things—is ultimately what links McVeigh and his 
victims. It is also what links McVeigh with his readers, since (as Waters puts 
it) “[t]he confrontation with death . . . pins the listener to a limit she will be 
able not to avoid or overcome but only to expect.”56
The poem as monument or epitaph also leads to the theme of mortality, 
which Waters describes as “the unexpected but logical result of trying to 
sustain a focus on a communication between someone present and an-
other (the poet) who is always absent.”57 “Timothy McVeigh’s Invictus’” 
is, again by dint of its context, clearly auto-epitaphic. Given the limits 
available for a man condemned to death, writing one’s own epitaph is, to 
return to Sturken’s point, a form of agency. But as Waters makes clear, a 
poem’s context also raises important issues regarding poetry as a form of 
contact: “Where the continuance of readers and the cessation of the writer 
occupy the same ground, poetry’s touch, and so poetic address, matter 
the most.”58 Set as it is at the moment both before and after death (since it 
was written by McVeigh prior, obviously, to his execution, but designed 
to be read after that event), “Timothy McVeigh’s ‘Invictus’” is a poem 
profoundly concerned with both mortality and immortality. Presented to 
an audience as the (self)epitaph of a dead man, it represents both cessa-
tion and (self)memorialization. No doubt these epitaphic and memorial 
elements of “Timothy McVeigh’s ‘Invictus’” are also sources of readers’ 
anxiety or distaste. The perpetrators of crimes, especially crimes as sin-
gular as McVeigh’s, are not given epitaphs or memorials. But, as Waters’s 
study shows, McVeigh’s use of poetry is scandalous for deeper reasons, 
reasons to do with poetry as a communicative act that brings together poet 
and audience: the ways in which “literature presses for a close relation 
with those into whose hands it may fall.”59 It is precisely this “close rela-
tion” that most readers will find disquieting about “Timothy McVeigh’s 
‘Invictus,’” a poem that claims a literary status even as the circumstances 
of its “composition” make it most unliterary. One more paradoxical fea-
ture of the poem, then, is the way in which it engages in formal language 
as a way to instigate intimacy with its readers.
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Another, perhaps accidental, index of commonality—as well as an in-
dication of touch—is that “Timothy McVeigh’s ‘Invictus’” is handwritten. 
One of the things that McVeigh’s statement expresses is McVeigh’s hand-
writing and thus his bodily existence,60 something soon to be eliminated 
by the state. By offering an example of his “hand” (to use an old-fashioned 
term for someone’s writing), McVeigh again draws attention to the fact 
that the “other” is actually “one of us,” just as the Sphinx’s riddle showed 
that a monster (which has in turn two, three, or four legs) is in fact a 
human. But it is also, like Keats’s famous fragment or poem “The Living 
Hand,” the hand of a dead man who wishes to haunt his future readers.
We may like to think that readers cannot simply make of a text what 
they want. Certainly there are various everyday cultural and legal con-
straints on what can be done with a text. Such constraints range from 
social opprobrium to copyright law. But, in this instance, such constraints 
seem to be singularly inapplicable. From the execution chamber—which 
is also a disturbing cultural echo chamber—the language of the dead, as 
found in the special paradoxical language of poetry, can make its way into 
mainstream culture, however little we might want to hear it. By speaking 
from the dead and through the words of the dead, McVeigh turns himself 
into a ghost so as to haunt the nation that he both sprung from and turned 
against.
David McCooey is an associate professor in Literary Studies at Deakin University in Geelong, 
Victoria. He is the author of the prizewinning Artful Histories: Modern Australian Auto-
biography (Cambridge University Press, 1996/2009), three collections of poetry, and numer-
ous essays, book chapters, and reviews on Australian poetry and life writing. He is the Deputy 
General Editor of The Literature of Australia (Norton, 2009).
NOTES
 1. For an account of McVeigh’s execution see Marita Sturken, Tourists of History: Memory, 
Kitsch, and Consumerism from Oklahoma City to Ground Zero (Durham, NC: Duke Uni-
versity Press, 2007), 139–64.
 2. Timothy McVeigh, “Final Statement of Timothy J. McVeigh” (written prior to his 
execution in Terre Haute, Indiana, 11 June 2001), http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/
ftrials/mcveigh/mcveighinvictus.html. It is assumed that McVeigh knew the poem by 
heart. Certainly, his reproduction of it is remarkably accurate. The final distich should 
be separated by a colon rather than the more idiomatic semicolon. Otherwise, McVeigh’s 
version is correct.
 3. Anon., “Text of Statement from McVeigh,” New York Times, 11 June 2001, www.
nytimes.com/2001/06/11/national/11CND-MTEXT.html.
 4. Margaret Drabble, ed., The Oxford Companion to English Literature (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 457.
504 DAVID McCOOEY
 5. Rosa Prince, “Gordon Brown in Plea to Labour MPs as Leadership Attacked,” Telegraph, 
11 January 2010, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/gordon-brown/6962538/Gordon-
Brown-in-plea-to-Labour-MPs-as-leadership-attacked.html.
 6. Christopher Howse, “Gordon Brown Chooses Invictus—The Favourite Poem of the 
Locked Ward,” Telegraph, 11 January 2010, http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/culture/chris-
topherhowse/100006084/gordon-brown-chooses-invictus-the-favourite-poem-of-the-
locked-ward/.
 7. Anon., O Magazine Readers’ Favourite Poems column, O: The Oprah Magazine, letter from 
Christine Evans, April 2011, www.oprah.com/spirit/O-Magazine-Readers-Favorite-Poems/3.
 8. Sturken, Tourists of History, 146.
 9. Ibid.
 10. Robert K. Elder, Last Words of the Executed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 3.
 11. Studs Terkel, foreword to ibid., xi.
 12. Elder, Last Words, 196.
 13. Ibid., 230–32.
 14. Gérard Genette, Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation (1987), trans. from the French by Jane 
E. Lewin, Literature, Culture, Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 75.
 15. J.C., NB column, Times Literary Supplement, no. 5124, 15 June 2001, 18.
 16. A. N. Wilson, “World of Books,” Telegraph, 11 June 2001, www.telegraph.co.uk/
comment/4262920/World-of-books.html.
 17. Catherine Robson, “Bloody, But Unbowed,” Times Literary Supplement, no. 5339, 29 July 
2005, 13.
 18. Quoted in Gore Vidal, “The Meaning of Timothy McVeigh,” in Perpetual War for Per-
petual Peace: How We Got to Be So Hated (New York: Thunder’s Mouth/Nation, 2002), 
81–122, quotation on 81.
 19. McVeigh referred to these events as relevant to his motives, subsequent to his trial.
 20. Sturken, Tourists of History, 143.
 21. Ibid., 157.
 22. Jody Lynee Madeira, “Blood Relations: Collective Memory, Cultural Trauma, and the 
Prosecution and Execution of Timothy McVeigh,” Studies in Law, Politics, and Society 45 
(2008): 75–138, esp. 117–21.
 23. Sturken, Tourists of History, 157.
 24. Ibid., 147.
 25. Vidal, “The Meaning of Timothy McVeigh,” 96.
 26. Edward T. Linenthal, Unfinished Bombing: Oklahoma City in American Memory (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 17.
 27. Sturken, Tourists of History, 146.
 28. Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny” (1919), The Uncanny, trans. David McLintock (Lon-
don: Penguin, 2001), 132.
 29. Nicholas Royle, The Uncanny (New York: Routledge, 2003), 1.
 30. Ibid.
 POETRY, TERRORISM, AND THE UNCANNY 505
 31. James Longenbach, The Resistance to Poetry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2004), 1–2.
 32. Karl Simms, Paul Ricoeur, Routledge Critical Thinkers (London: Routledge, 2003), 43.
 33. Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1973).
 34. Mary Orr, Intertextuality: Debates and Contexts (Cambridge, England: Polity, 2003), 133.
 35. Ibid., 132.
 36. Ibid., 135.
 37. Ibid., 139.
 38. Ibid., 132.
 39. Daniel Tiffany, Infidel Poetics: Riddles, Nightlife, Substance (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 2009), 2.
 40. Ibid., 6.
 41. Ibid., 2.
 42. Ibid., 7.
 43. Ibid.
 44. Ibid., 8.
 45. Ibid., 12.
 46. Ibid., 68.
 47. Ibid., 69.
 48. Ibid., 72.
 49. Ibid. Willis Goth Regier notes the link between terrorism and the figure of the Sphinx in 
popular culture in his Book of the Sphinx (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 8.
 50. Tiffany, Infidel Poetics, 90.
 51. Linenthal, Unfinished Bombing, 114.
 52. See Liedeke Plate, “Bearing Witness: Gender and the Poetry of 9/11,” Women’s Studies 
37, no. 1 (2008): 1–16.
 53. William Waters, Poetry’s Touch: On Lyric Address (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2003), 5. Although it is unlikely that McVeigh was aware of it, the elegiac, dedicatory na-
ture of Henley’s poem (as it appeared in “Echoes”) also complicates the apparently simple 
first-person nature of the text.
 54. Ibid., 16.
 55. Ibid., 79.
 56. Ibid., 104.
 57. Ibid., 16.
 58. Ibid., 106.
 59. Ibid., 144.
 60. I am indebted to the Australian poet Michael Farrell for pointing this out to me.
